This documents summarizes a number of analyses and results that were impossible to include in the article and the published online applendix due to space constraints. We begin with Section "F" so the document can be read as a continuation of the online appendix.
such that diversion to the outside good remains relatively constant. Demand is somewhat more elastic with larger market sizes, but we have confirmed that this does not meaningfully affect inferences on the supply-side. Columns (iii) and (iv) are estimated with a normalization that the nesting parameter is 0.70 and 0.60, respectively. We exclude instruments based on the number of products and summed distance, which are no longer needed for identification. As expected, lower values of ρ correspond to greater diversion to the outside good, but otherwise the demand results are mostly unchanged. Considered together, these results indicate that the nesting parameter responds as it should to the market size, and that the results hold over a plausible range of the nesting parameter.
G Validity of the Demand-Side Instruments
We now discuss some possible concerns about the validity of the instruments. We start with the post-merger indicator for ABI and MillerCoors products. Including this in the instrument set imposes the assumption that the changes in unobserved demand for ABI/MillerCoors, before versus after the merger, are not systematically different from the changes in the unobserved demand for Modelo/Heineken. The validity of the instrument could come into question if the model understates the effect of the recession on preferences for (cheaper) domestic beer. While this is difficult to rule out entirely, the income interactions that we employ in the demand specifications allow the recession to impact demand in a sensible manner, and there is little else to be done empirically. The number of products primarily serves to identify the nesting parameter. Variation arises because not all products are sold in each region-period. Given the structure of the data (39 regions, 39 products, 72 months) there are 109,512 possible product-region-period observations of which 94,565 (or 86.43%) are realized. Because the more popular products are sold in every region-period, variation arises due to the entry and exit of the less popular brands. This could raise concern if sales are sufficiently thin that entry/exit reflects measurement error in the data rather than true underlying variation in conditions. However, this does not seem to be the case. Consider the case of Michelob 24-packs, which are observed in 956 of the 2808 month-year combinations. Figure G .1 plots whether the product was observed in each month, by city. There are some instances in which the empirical patterns could be driven by measurement error (e.g., Boston), but more commonly the existence of sales is persistent. Analyses of other products are similar.
H Unobserved Trends
The baseline specifications incorporate time fixed effect to account for changes in cost and demand conditions that affect all products. Bias could arise to the extent that unobserved changes in the market affect products differentially. Of particular concern would be unobserved changes that affect ABI differently than Modelo/Heineken, which would undermine our key identifying restrictions. One possible source of bias is the (gradual) increase in consumption of craft beers that occurs through the sample period. It is possible that craft beer is a closer competitor to imports than to ABI/MillerCoors, on the basis that craft and imported beers tend to have higher prices and sell in smaller package sizes.
As a robustness check, we reestimate the RCNL-2 specification using the shorter time windows of 2008-2009 and 2007-2010 The downside is that discarding data could reduce the precision of the estimates. Figure 3 ). The marginal cost parameters are not shown in the table, but are quite similar to those obtained from the full dataset. Overall, the analysis supports that the main econometric results are not unduly influenced by unobserved trends. For a second check on changing demand conditions, we estimate the demand-side of the model separately with the pre-merger and the post-merger data. The post-merger ABI indicator that we use as an instrument for the price coefficient is no longer applicable, so there is a loss of power in the first stage. This creates numerical problems with the RCNL. Thus, we generate results using the baseline nested logit specification, which can be estimated with 2SLS. The results are in Table H .2. The parameter estimates are similar in the two time periods. The price coefficient is larger than what is obtained with the full sample, implying more elastic demand. It also is less precisely estimated. Regressions that use the full sample but exclude the post-merger ABI indicator from the instrument set obtain similar results. While we cannot estimate the supply-side of the model with only pre-merger or post-merger data, from the numerical experiments in the published online appendix we know that more elastic demand generates larger estimates of the κ parameter, all else equal. Lastly, Table H .3 provides estimates of an adjusted supply-side model that incorporates bilateral nominal exchange rates (domestic-currency units per unit of foreign currency) into the marginal cost function. This allows us to determine whether exchange rate fluctuations, which affect the relative costs of ABI and Modelo/Heineken, impact estimates of κ parameter. We show results for each of the demand specifications in Table H .3. The exchange rate parameter ranges from −0.041 to 0.760 in the RCNL specifications, and the other estimates are largely unaffected. We exclude the exchange rates from the baseline specifications because structural interpretation is difficult without decomposing the costs of Modelo/Heineken into a local non-traded component due to U.S. distribution and retail and a nonlocal component due to foreign production.
I Additional Estimation Results
Figure I.1 plots the marginal cost and demand time fixed effects in the RCNL-1 specification. The demand fixed effects are seasonal, reflecting that demand for beer is strongest in the summer and weakest in the winter. There is a gradual reduction in the willingness-to-pay for beer over the sample period. Among other considerations, this could reflect the trend toward microbreweries (which are included in the outside good). The marginal cost fixed effects decrease in the pre-merger periods, stabilize over 2009-2010, and then drop again 2011. We suspect that the observed import price decreases over 2009-2010 can be explained from changes in macroeconomic conditions, but that the import price decreases in 2011 load onto the cost fixed effects. Table I .2 provides a histogram of the marginal cost region fixed effects in the RCNL-1 specification. The fixed effect of Atlanta is normalized to zero. As shown, most region fixed effects range over (−1, 0) , with a few regions having lower costs on average. It is possible that these cost fixed effects are picking up some demand-side variability because we do not incorporate region fixed effects on the demand-side (otherwise the RCNL nesting parameter is too difficult to identify with any precision). Figure I .3 provides a histogram of the consumer-specific income coefficients obtained with the RCNL-1 specification. The histogram aggregates together all the income draws. With 39 regions, seven years, and 500 draws per region-year, this amounts to a total of 136,500 draws. We subtract the global mean from all the income draws prior to estimation. Thus, the price coefficient of −0.0887 that is reported in Table 4 represents the average effect of price on indirect utility. The 25th and 75th percentiles in the distribution of consumer-specific price coefficients are −0.1039 and −0.0772, respectively. The minimum and maximum are −0.1138 and −0.0129. The left tail of the distribution reflects that we Fixed Effect Value J a n 2 0 0 5 J a n 2 0 0 6 J a n 2 0 0 7 J a n 2 0 0 8 J a n 2 0 0 9 J a n 2 0 1 0 J a n 2 0 1 1 J a n 2 0 1 2
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Figure I.1: Marginal Cost and Demand Time Fixed Effects in RCNL-1
Notes: The figure plots the estimated time fixed effects that affect preferences for the inside good (on the demand-side) and the marginal costs of all products (on the supply-side). We divide the demand fixed effects by the absolute value of the price coefficient, prior to plotting, so that the units are in dollars. 1 In robustness checks, we have experimented with a number of different ways to sample income. These including using individual income, household income, and household income divided by the number of family members. For each of these, we have tried dropping negative incomes, dropping incomes below five thousand, and recoding negative incomes as zeros. We top-code income at the 95th percentile in each case to limit the Table I .1 shows the mean demand elasticities that correspond to the RCNL-3 specification of Table 4 . As shown, the higher-priced imports tend to have more elastic demand. This is mechanical because the specification does not allow income to rotate the demand curve. For example, with logit demand the own price elasticity of product j is simply αp j (1 − s j ). If income is allowed to rotate demand, as in the RCNL-1 specification, then we find that the higher-priced imports still have more elastic demand, but by a smaller amount. The logit restriction that consumers substitute to other products in proportion to their market shares is somewhat relaxed. Looking along column (5) for Corona Extra, there is considerable heterogeneity in the cross-elasticities, but the same is not true in column (1) for Bud Light. Thus, while the coefficient estimates of RCNL-3 introduce qualitatively similar effects on substitution, they provide less meaningful departures from nested logit demand.
influence of positive outliers. The demand-side results are robust. 
The table provides mean elasticities of demand for 12-packs based on the RCNL-3 specification (column (iv) of Table ? ?). The cell entry in row i and column j is the percentage change in the quantity of product i with respect to the price of product j. Means are calculated across the year-month-region combinations. The category cross-elasticities are the percentage change in the combined shares of products in the category due to a 1 percent change in the price of the product in question. Letting the category be defined by the set B, the calculation is j∈B,j =k
. The categories exclude the product in question.
Thus, for example, the table shows that a 1 percent change in the price of a Bud Light 12-pack increases sales of other 12-packs by 0.281 percent. Table I .2 provides the brewer markups that arise from the RCNL-3 specification. Similar before/after comparisons can be made about the effect of the merger. MillerCoors markups increase due to greater market power and lower costs; ABI markups increase due to greater market power; and Modelo/Heineken markups are relatively unaffected. The markup for products of the same firm are quite similar with the RCNL-3 specification. This is again because the demand estimates to not introduce large departures from nested logit demand (which dictates that multiproduct firms equate markups across products).
Our baseline demand specification imposes that heterogeneity in consumer tastes for product observables is due solely to income. This restriction is not necessary, and indeed many choice models allow consumer tastes to depend on random draws from a standard normal distribution (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1996); Nevo (2001)). We explore adding unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for observables using the following redefinition of the consumer-specific parameters:
where Σ is a diagonal scaling matrix with diagonal elements (ν 1 , ν 2 , . . . ) that determine the importance of the standard normal draws. Our baseline specifications implicitly set Σ equal to the zero matrix. Table I .3 summarizes the results from two augmented specifications.
In column (i) we add an interaction between price and the N(0,1) draws to the RCNL-2 specification. The coefficient on the interaction is small and has a t-statistic of about 0.02. The other coefficients are similar to their counterparts in the baseline RCNL-2 regressions. In column (ii) we add an interaction between the constant and the N(0,1) draws to the RCNL-4 specification. Again the coefficient on the interaction is small and imprecisely estimated, and the other coefficients do not change much. This pattern has held in a number of other specifications. The use of N(0,1) draws to incorporate unobserved taste heterogeneity does not affect the results, so we opt for the simpler approach in our baseline specifications.
J Additional Counterfactual Results
We develop confidence bounds for selected welfare statistics using a partial bootstrap. We start by drawing 100 values from the estimated distribution of κ. This distribution reflects the impact of demand-side uncertainty on supply-side precision. We calculate markups based on the demand estimates and each random value of κ, and reestimate the linear marginal cost parameters. Finally, we recompute equilibrium in the post-merger periods in the counterfactual scenario that the merger does not occur. We use the RCNL-2 specification with quarterly data to reduce the computation burden. The results of RCNL-2 and RCNL-1 are quite similar so the confidence bounds are relevant to the counterfactual analysis presented in the body of the paper. Figure J .1 plots prices for Miller Light and Bud Light 12-packs. The raw data are shown in black and each of the 100 "no merger" scenarios are shown in gray. The raw data exceed all of the simulated prices. We also calculate the percentage change in producer surplus, consumer surplus, and total surplus due to the merger. We find that producer surplus increases by 19% with a 90% confidence interval of (16%,21%). Consumer surplus decreases by 3.9% with a confidence interval of (−5.6%,−2.5%). Total surplus increases by 1.5% with a confidence interval of (−0.5%,3.0%). A one-sided test rejects the null hypothesis that total surplus decreases at the ten percent level.
An interesting feature of the counterfactual "no merger" scenario is that the Bud Light prices appear to fall somewhat in the post-merger periods relative to the pre-merger periods (e.g., see Figure 5 ). This happens in part due to the trends down in the demand and marginal cost time fixed effects shown in Figure I .1. To explore this further, we recompute equilibrium prices under all scenarios under the following adjustments:
• Post-merger time fixed effects take the value of the May 2008 fixed effect. • Diesel prices in the post-merger periods take the May 2008 value.
• The 2008 income draws are used in 2009, 2010, and 2011.
• The structural error terms are zero in all time periods. The alternative model captures a game in which all firms in the coalition increase prices above Nash-Bertrand level by the same amount. Denote the level increase κ. The vector of equilibrium prices in each region-period satisfies the first order condition
where elements of the vector ι t are indicators that equal one for ABI/MillerCoors products in post-merger periods. The alternative ownership matrix, Ω t , is standard and free of supplyside parameters. Thus markups are additively separable in the Nash-Bertrand markup and the κ parameter. We parameterize marginal costs as in equation (11 The empirical variation that identifies the κ parameter again relates to whether ABI price increases exceed what can be explained under Nash-Bertrand competition. Unbiasedness follows from the same identifying assumption employed in the baseline supply model: changes in the unobserved costs of ABI, before versus after the merger, are not systematically different from the changes in the unobserved costs of Modelo and Heineken. Table K .1 shows the results for each of the demand specifications. The marginal cost parameters are close to those obtained from the baseline supply model (e.g., see Table 6 ). The estimates of κ range from 0.600 to 0.805. Post-merger Nash-Bertrand competition is rejected because the estimates are statistically different than zero. Interpreted strictly, the results suggest that coordination results in price increases of $0.60-$0.80. The magnitude of this effect is quite comparable to what arises with the baseline supply model. For example, Table 10 indicates that with the RCNL-1 specification, coordination increases the average markups of ABI from $3.81 to $4.45, a change of $0.64.
